blahog blahog blahog
Lundgren and McMakin bring up a point in Chapter 4 (pg. 63) that seems to be contagious in this country—apathy. “Audiences in care communication (and to a lesser degree some crisis communication efforts) are often apathetic.”
I’m not a PR major, so maybe I’m underinformed—or just plain wrong—but I’m highly skeptical of the general public’s ability to intelligently follow any issue of social consequence, and more skeptical of its collective capacity to make reasonable decisions even when presented with immutable facts. We are not a science or health literate society—most of us don’t care unless it’s dropped on our doorstep.
I understand that in risk and crisis communication efforts, any organization must offer to involve the public, and theoretically, it’s the proper position to take. So Lundgren and McMakin do so (at least in these readings), which I think is idealistic.
I’m sure there are many cases where an informed target audience successfully interacts with a public-minded organization, but I think these are exceptions. Maybe I’ll change my mind over the course of the semester.
Which type of approach to risk communication is the current federal administration using in its current effort to secure support for it policy in Iraq? (Lundgren & McMakin, Chapter 2). Is this administration listening? To anyone? By all indications, it is not using any of the 12 approaches to communicating risk Lundgren and McMakin have advanced, so that proves the point I made above. The authors are idealistic thinking the public can understand and make intelligent decisions on issues of policy. And obviously, the current administration thinks so. And maybe it’s just using the old press agentry/publicity model of public relations: source-receiver one-way communication based on incomplete, distorted, or only partially true information. Lundgren and McMakin ask (Chapter 2, pg. 13) “Are all [12] approaches equally valid?” Apparently, none are. And the administration is loathe to make risk comparisons to Vietnam, although many journalists are.
Lundgren and McMakin deal with uncertainty in Chapter 6 (pg. 104). If you are in charge of the communication and know the risks and therefore can anticipate answers to the questions, you’re in good shape. But from a journalistic standpoint, you may have to collect and present scientific information. Sources may conflict and you may have difficulty in determining what the “truth” is. One strategy is to present an array of viewpoints. But that could lead to confusion. Are there PR strategies to counteract a situation like this?
When people assess personal risk, it is theorized they will use not only the information you give them (as the representative of an organization), but other information as well. Mass media plays a role, but people are more likely to use interpersonal channels of communication—friends, colleagues, others in their community. As a risk communicator, knowing your audience is certainly a benefit, but may not necessarily make your communication efforts successful.
Mic Brookshire
I’m not a PR major, so maybe I’m underinformed—or just plain wrong—but I’m highly skeptical of the general public’s ability to intelligently follow any issue of social consequence, and more skeptical of its collective capacity to make reasonable decisions even when presented with immutable facts. We are not a science or health literate society—most of us don’t care unless it’s dropped on our doorstep.
I understand that in risk and crisis communication efforts, any organization must offer to involve the public, and theoretically, it’s the proper position to take. So Lundgren and McMakin do so (at least in these readings), which I think is idealistic.
I’m sure there are many cases where an informed target audience successfully interacts with a public-minded organization, but I think these are exceptions. Maybe I’ll change my mind over the course of the semester.
Which type of approach to risk communication is the current federal administration using in its current effort to secure support for it policy in Iraq? (Lundgren & McMakin, Chapter 2). Is this administration listening? To anyone? By all indications, it is not using any of the 12 approaches to communicating risk Lundgren and McMakin have advanced, so that proves the point I made above. The authors are idealistic thinking the public can understand and make intelligent decisions on issues of policy. And obviously, the current administration thinks so. And maybe it’s just using the old press agentry/publicity model of public relations: source-receiver one-way communication based on incomplete, distorted, or only partially true information. Lundgren and McMakin ask (Chapter 2, pg. 13) “Are all [12] approaches equally valid?” Apparently, none are. And the administration is loathe to make risk comparisons to Vietnam, although many journalists are.
Lundgren and McMakin deal with uncertainty in Chapter 6 (pg. 104). If you are in charge of the communication and know the risks and therefore can anticipate answers to the questions, you’re in good shape. But from a journalistic standpoint, you may have to collect and present scientific information. Sources may conflict and you may have difficulty in determining what the “truth” is. One strategy is to present an array of viewpoints. But that could lead to confusion. Are there PR strategies to counteract a situation like this?
When people assess personal risk, it is theorized they will use not only the information you give them (as the representative of an organization), but other information as well. Mass media plays a role, but people are more likely to use interpersonal channels of communication—friends, colleagues, others in their community. As a risk communicator, knowing your audience is certainly a benefit, but may not necessarily make your communication efforts successful.
Mic Brookshire
posted by nyuspike at
1/15/2007 08:27:00 PM
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