Here's how to persuade the bobos
Wes Jamison PUR 6934 Reaction blog #4 Lundgren and McMakin chapter 13
Chapter 13 forms the prelude to part III, which fittingly enough begins with this quote: “The farther away we get from individual contact, the more room there is for confusion and misunderstanding” (pp. 193). Spoken like true disciples, Lundgren and McMakin take us through the many tasks associated with implementation of risk communication with nary a digression into any messy discourse on the ethics of using language and framing in the service of individuated interest.
Chapter 13 is really about learning how to choose and use information, and about the selection, organization, rhetoric, and narrative stylization of risk messages. As always, the authors refer to the axiomatic “know your audience” refrain to begin their discussion. Once that is accepted as a truism, they begin to lay out a concise and helpful series of checklists regarding information on risk. They note that risk communication consists of the goals and content of the information, the nature of the risk, alternatives to exposure to the risk, any uncertainties associated with the risk. They also suggest that risk management is a component to be communicated, as is any benefits of the risk, audience actions that may alleviate or mitigate the risk, who to contact, plus additional information to take the esoteric and jargon-filled language of risk assessment and placing within the context of the exoteric stakeholders.
Interestingly, Covello and Kasperson have both noted problematic developments in the realm of communicating risk uncertainty. They both note that the presence of risk uncertainty amplifies stakeholder anxiety, and the Eurobarometer Survey has noted that the “tipping point” whereby stakeholders, when confronted with scientific uncertainty and risk uncertainty, withdraw from public discourse regarding the risk, is relatively low and easily manipulated. To put it another way, when faced with uncertainty, consumers are decreasingly relying upon rationality and logical evaluation of competing truth claims, and instead they are retreating from the public discourse regarding risk into their cognitive communities of meaning, into their clusters of “people like me,” to help them answer that three basic questions that people bring to risk assessment: what is it, what should I think about it, and what should I do about it. The implications of this are breathtaking: purposive political organizations (using Wilson’s typology) are now using this public uncertainty aversion for political gain. Indeed, research has indicated that NGOs in Europe self-consciously sought to cast GM foods in a negative light by raising the specter of “scientific uncertainty.” They knew from the literature in social psychology that consumers would withdraw from the discourse in the face of uncertainty, hence their strategy was to contest all scientific claims, regardless of rigor or merit, with rivaling scientific claims. In other words, no “fact” would be allowed to gain heuristic footing without another, contesting and conflicting “fact” being forwarded to create the sense of uncertainty. Lundgren and McMakin would have done well to discuss this further---their discussion on pp. 197 and in Chapter 6 could have been bolstered by a discussion of the emerging research on the social psychology of risk uncertainty and its impact on the ability to communicate risk.
Nonetheless, the authors provide very valuable practitioner suggestions, from the ideas regarding organizing materials in such a way so that how the risk was determined is abundantly clear, to giving a summary of results for more sophisticated readers. Interestingly, in their discussion of language and rhetoric for risk information materials, the authors cross an ethical line: they note “Avoid any kind of language that might give your audience the feeling that they have no control” (pp. 201). However, many modern risks are so problematic and divisive exactly because stakeholders have no control! That is, Covello notes that lack of control of modern risk is a key factor in audience anxiety. Beck supports this in Risk Society, and Perrow also notes this in Normal Accidents. That is to say, “control” is a very context-dependent, socially constructed reality, and in many settings it is a ruse, a myth. After all, the authors should know that residents of the tri-city area in southeastern Washington have no control over radioactive leeching, radioactive decay rates, or background and direct exposure to radioactivity derived from Hanford. They should know that often times various publics really do lack control over their exposure to and knowledge of risks. Indeed, much of the literature on environmental racism makes this exact point. But instead, Lundgren and McMakin take the philosophically pragmatic approach, advocating an ethics of default in that they presuppose that successful risk communication can and should be uncoupled from the reality of the situation to their various publics. Hence, they actually advocate not telling publics they have no control, when they very well know of situations where this is indeed the case.
Another interesting discussion is their chapter concerned narrative and rhetoric, and they note that the language of risk communication is as important as the technical content of the actual communications. In other words, they note that presentation can be more important than content, or to paraphrase the old marketing flacks, “sell the sizzle, not the steak!” This makes intuitive sense, and we all know from experience that framing and language structure make immense importance in communications. They note that audience involvement, relevance and ability to understand the language are all central to the rhetoric of risk. Furthermore, they note that constructing such narratives in the form of testimonials by “people like me” can be effective ways to communicate a risk narrative. This indeed sounds compelling, but upon further reflection I’m left with a nagging thought: no truer form or persuasion in the service of self-interest has ever been devised. The use of rhetoric, meta-narratives and existential identification with risk rhetors is relatively new, and the consequences of such approaches have barely been discussed, much less debated. The authors would have been well-served to refrain from discussing such potentially effective and destructive methodology prior to its maturation in the literature.
The rest of the chapter lists the many mundane and pedestrian considerations of risk communication, and ends with a very practical checklist of information materials and formats for successful risk communication. However, one cannot read this chapter without feeling nebulously queasy over the idea of risk communicators with vested interests in a nuclear enrichment facility that sits atop the Superfund list using social psychology and other techniques to persuade people about risks; they advocate approaches that certainly warrant discussion in the ethics literature (e.g. assuring people they have control when they really don’t); and they view risk communication as a series of checklists to be completed. How does that approach bring us any closer to our audiences? Likewise, the emerging literature on risk uncertainty and its use for political purposes warrants further discussion.
Chapter 13 forms the prelude to part III, which fittingly enough begins with this quote: “The farther away we get from individual contact, the more room there is for confusion and misunderstanding” (pp. 193). Spoken like true disciples, Lundgren and McMakin take us through the many tasks associated with implementation of risk communication with nary a digression into any messy discourse on the ethics of using language and framing in the service of individuated interest.
Chapter 13 is really about learning how to choose and use information, and about the selection, organization, rhetoric, and narrative stylization of risk messages. As always, the authors refer to the axiomatic “know your audience” refrain to begin their discussion. Once that is accepted as a truism, they begin to lay out a concise and helpful series of checklists regarding information on risk. They note that risk communication consists of the goals and content of the information, the nature of the risk, alternatives to exposure to the risk, any uncertainties associated with the risk. They also suggest that risk management is a component to be communicated, as is any benefits of the risk, audience actions that may alleviate or mitigate the risk, who to contact, plus additional information to take the esoteric and jargon-filled language of risk assessment and placing within the context of the exoteric stakeholders.
Interestingly, Covello and Kasperson have both noted problematic developments in the realm of communicating risk uncertainty. They both note that the presence of risk uncertainty amplifies stakeholder anxiety, and the Eurobarometer Survey has noted that the “tipping point” whereby stakeholders, when confronted with scientific uncertainty and risk uncertainty, withdraw from public discourse regarding the risk, is relatively low and easily manipulated. To put it another way, when faced with uncertainty, consumers are decreasingly relying upon rationality and logical evaluation of competing truth claims, and instead they are retreating from the public discourse regarding risk into their cognitive communities of meaning, into their clusters of “people like me,” to help them answer that three basic questions that people bring to risk assessment: what is it, what should I think about it, and what should I do about it. The implications of this are breathtaking: purposive political organizations (using Wilson’s typology) are now using this public uncertainty aversion for political gain. Indeed, research has indicated that NGOs in Europe self-consciously sought to cast GM foods in a negative light by raising the specter of “scientific uncertainty.” They knew from the literature in social psychology that consumers would withdraw from the discourse in the face of uncertainty, hence their strategy was to contest all scientific claims, regardless of rigor or merit, with rivaling scientific claims. In other words, no “fact” would be allowed to gain heuristic footing without another, contesting and conflicting “fact” being forwarded to create the sense of uncertainty. Lundgren and McMakin would have done well to discuss this further---their discussion on pp. 197 and in Chapter 6 could have been bolstered by a discussion of the emerging research on the social psychology of risk uncertainty and its impact on the ability to communicate risk.
Nonetheless, the authors provide very valuable practitioner suggestions, from the ideas regarding organizing materials in such a way so that how the risk was determined is abundantly clear, to giving a summary of results for more sophisticated readers. Interestingly, in their discussion of language and rhetoric for risk information materials, the authors cross an ethical line: they note “Avoid any kind of language that might give your audience the feeling that they have no control” (pp. 201). However, many modern risks are so problematic and divisive exactly because stakeholders have no control! That is, Covello notes that lack of control of modern risk is a key factor in audience anxiety. Beck supports this in Risk Society, and Perrow also notes this in Normal Accidents. That is to say, “control” is a very context-dependent, socially constructed reality, and in many settings it is a ruse, a myth. After all, the authors should know that residents of the tri-city area in southeastern Washington have no control over radioactive leeching, radioactive decay rates, or background and direct exposure to radioactivity derived from Hanford. They should know that often times various publics really do lack control over their exposure to and knowledge of risks. Indeed, much of the literature on environmental racism makes this exact point. But instead, Lundgren and McMakin take the philosophically pragmatic approach, advocating an ethics of default in that they presuppose that successful risk communication can and should be uncoupled from the reality of the situation to their various publics. Hence, they actually advocate not telling publics they have no control, when they very well know of situations where this is indeed the case.
Another interesting discussion is their chapter concerned narrative and rhetoric, and they note that the language of risk communication is as important as the technical content of the actual communications. In other words, they note that presentation can be more important than content, or to paraphrase the old marketing flacks, “sell the sizzle, not the steak!” This makes intuitive sense, and we all know from experience that framing and language structure make immense importance in communications. They note that audience involvement, relevance and ability to understand the language are all central to the rhetoric of risk. Furthermore, they note that constructing such narratives in the form of testimonials by “people like me” can be effective ways to communicate a risk narrative. This indeed sounds compelling, but upon further reflection I’m left with a nagging thought: no truer form or persuasion in the service of self-interest has ever been devised. The use of rhetoric, meta-narratives and existential identification with risk rhetors is relatively new, and the consequences of such approaches have barely been discussed, much less debated. The authors would have been well-served to refrain from discussing such potentially effective and destructive methodology prior to its maturation in the literature.
The rest of the chapter lists the many mundane and pedestrian considerations of risk communication, and ends with a very practical checklist of information materials and formats for successful risk communication. However, one cannot read this chapter without feeling nebulously queasy over the idea of risk communicators with vested interests in a nuclear enrichment facility that sits atop the Superfund list using social psychology and other techniques to persuade people about risks; they advocate approaches that certainly warrant discussion in the ethics literature (e.g. assuring people they have control when they really don’t); and they view risk communication as a series of checklists to be completed. How does that approach bring us any closer to our audiences? Likewise, the emerging literature on risk uncertainty and its use for political purposes warrants further discussion.
posted by Wes Jamison at
2/03/2007 03:31:00 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home