The cases outlined in US&S chapter 6 were an excellent primer on the “dos and don’ts” of crisis response in the food industry and it’s obvious that lessons learned from these experiences are still being used today.
The very nature of the food industry should automatically mandate a higher level of crisis planning and preparedness. Restaurants and food suppliers should exceed every standard required for safety and cleanliness in order to minimize the risk as much as possible. The public places their trust in the food industry, trust which is hard to regain.
I was surprised by Jack-in-the-Box’s initial reaction to the E.coli scare in 1992. Given the severity of the illnesses, I would have expected a more swift and decisive response, rather than the “wait and see approach” that was used. I understand that they were waiting for an official statement before taking any action, but their delay possibly resulted in more people getting sick, and also hurt their crisis communication efforts. When they were found to be at fault, they finally took the step of recalling all of the beef from the shipment determined to be the source of the infection, calling the move “an extraordinary step” (p.86)..
Their crisis communication strategy did fall mostly in line with Benoit’s image restoration typology, in which a company’s public response goes through the following cycle: denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification.
-Denial: they acknowledged the crisis existed, but denied responsibility, stating that “it is unclear as to the source of an illness linked to undercooked beef” (p.85)
-Evading responsibility: they were critical of their meat supplier and of government agencies charged with inspecting the meat prior to sale, and denied any knowledge of the change in grill temperatures that could have averted the crisis.
-Reducing offensiveness: they tried to insist that its grills were “operating at a temperature that met a lower national standard”; yet this didn’t solve anything, as obviously their cooking procedures weren’t sufficient to eradicate the E.coli since over 400 people got sick.
-Corrective action/mortification: their decision to finally recall the infected beef came after a considerable number of people had already been sickened, so it wasn’t as effective as an immediate recall would have been. However, the CEO publicly addressed their denial of receiving the updated grill procedures, saying that they had located it in their files after all. In addition, they completely revamped their organizational communication and public relations procedures in order to keep more control over their documentation and in-store policies. Finally, Jack in the Box “closely scrutinizes all the beef it purchases and maintains grill temperatures in excess of the highest standards” (p.87).
Luckily, the approach today seems to be the opposite: as with the recent E.coli scare with spinach, many retailers pulled spinach completely from their shelves and menus even before the exact cause of the outbreak was determined. While this also resulted in lost income, the proactive nature of their action helped keep the public’s trust intact, seeing that the industry had the customer’s best interests at heart.
This is also the way Chi-Chi’s and Schwan’s chose to deal with their respective crisis situations, immediately taking corrective action to deal with the situation at hand. In Chi-Chi’s case, their crisis response strategy was well-intentioned, but their organizational and financial position wasn’t strong enough to support their plan to the fullest extent.
Schwan’s also chose this route, pulling their products from the shelves even before they were found to be the cause of the salmonella outbreak. They had the advantage of a face-to-face distribution process, so they could apologize personally to customers, as well as distribute refunds and collect recalled product. In addition, they set up a hotline and offered to reimburse customers for medical testing to determine if they’d contracted salmonella. Their commitment to customer service (and the complete support of their company president) allowed them to survive the crisis relatively unscathed.
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I found the readings on the food-borne illnesses both informative and applicable to risk and crisis public relations situations we all will face in our careers. While these were extreme examples, we have much to learn about how these companies approached both their responsibilities and their communications tactics.
As some other have pointed out, the first glaring mistake of Jack-in-the-Box was to say that destroying the beef was an “extraordinary step.” This is an offensive and patronizing statement. First of all, illness and death were involved in this case; if the first concern is portraying to customers its commitment to safety and trustworthiness, then this organization failed miserably by demonstrating instead that in fact its first concern was its collective corporate ego. Secondly, shifting blame can only be used if it is certain (which in this case it wasn’t) and it still didn’t address the concern that, ultimately, the beef was served at Jack-in-the-box restaurants. While it may have been tainted and passed other requirements, at the end of the day the food was not cooked properly and was served to the public at Jack-in-the-box. Clearly, restaurant representatives displayed uncertainty in how to deal with this situation and it damaged the company’s reputation.
Similarly, the Chi-Chi’s case study was fascinating because of how complicated it was. The “long incubation period and the general difficulty in tracing the cause of the outbreak” (p. 91) must have made for a long year for Chi-Chi’s crisis response team. However, even in its difficult circumstances, Chi-Chi’s displayed what Jack-in-the-Box should have – admitting “at least a share of the responsibility” and “consistently emphasizing that the well-being of its patrons and employees was paramount.” If an organization can display these two sentiments sincerely, it can go a long way in, at the very least, encouraging communication and, at best, restoring public trust.
In the Schwan’s case, personal communication came into play. Because the company had personal connection through product delivery, and was able to talk with and recover personally the tainted ice cream, as well as staff a phone line that was personally answered instead of posting a recording. This situation was a great example of avoiding “routine solutions” (p. 19) and instead coming up with a plan that dealt with the specific problems at hand, mainly getting the ice cream out of customers’ homes and ensuring the customers would be financially reimbursed. Unlike Chi-Chi’s, Schwan’s was fortunate to be able to keep track of its customer base and have an extrememly high recall rate. Schwan’s avoided placing blame, took responsibility and then went through necessary measures to make sure its customers were safe. In other words, Schwan’s determined “who is responsible, what people should do, who is affected and how the victims should be compensated” (p. 23).
Although the concept of ethics in public relations has been much-researched but not as clearly defined, we can still operate ethically according to our personal beliefs. If it is easiest for public relations practitioners to operate in this way by imagining angry publics, then that’s a start. If communication with an angry public is virtually impossible (p. 80), then as communicators we must do everything we can to include publics in the “planning of risk assessment” (p. 78) from the beginning.
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Lauren, at 9:34 PM
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