Risk/Crisis Communication

Sunday, April 08, 2007

New Madrid Earthquake Prediction and Grunig's Situation Theory of Publics

Since you all read the article, I will spare you as many background details as possible. This study focused on applying Grunig’s Situational Theory of Publics to a sample of people in the New Madrid Seismic Zone after a prediction that an earthquake with a magnitude between 6.5 and 7.5 would hit the area.

There is no such thing as a general public and Grunig’s situation theory of publics provides a framework around the publics involved with disaster preparedness or response. Major then breaks down situational theory into three sets of variables: belief in prediction and personalized risk, personal and societal factors, and mastery. Much of the necessity for this type of communications comes from the difficulty and inaccuracy involved in earthquake prediction and preparedness, which is where the article draws its situation from.

I thought one of the more interesting variables that Major discusses comes directly after her breakdown of situational theory. The role that the news media has in the believability of a prediction since they “chronicle debates” (p. 490). This could definitely throw a wrench in the gears of a prediction if it is controversial, giving anyone who wants an excuse not to evacuate a reason to stay behind. That is quite the hurdle for the public relations practitioner to surpass.

DISCUSSION QUESTION 1: What are some of the best ways to deal with a situation such as this when problem recognition is high?

Giselle did a good job explaining this version of the situational theory of publics. Check out her blog posting since Major (1998) uses different terminology.

Major developed a number of hypotheses (nine total):

  1. The problem-facing public will be associated with (a) interpersonal discussion and (b) news media use.
  2. Belief in the prediction will separate high problem recognition publics (i.e., problem facers and constrained) from low problem recognition publics (i.e., routines and fatals).
  3. Personalized risk should separate the high constraint recognition publics (i.e., the constrained and fatals) from the low constraint recognition publics (i.e., the problem facers and the routines) regardless of belief in the prediction.
  4. Level of involvement should separate the high from the low problem recognition publics.
  5. The estimated risk of being killed or injured in an earthquake should separate the high from the low constraint recognition publics.
  6. Belief in prophetic predictions will be associated with the fatal public.
  7. The perceived influence of (a) interpersonal discussion and (b) news media use on the perceived importance of the earthquake problem will separate the problem facers from the other three publics.
  8. Societal-level constraint recognition will separate low from high constraint recognition publics with low societal-level constraint recognition associated low constraint recognition.
  9. The mastery variables, (a) perceived preparedness and (b) willingness to pay more taxes for earthquake mitigation, will separate the low constraint recognition publics from the high constraint recognition publics.

Major then telephone surveyed 629 people in the New Madrid Seismic Zone.

Supported Hypotheses were: 1a, 3(partially), 4, 6, 7a, 7b, 8, 9a (partially),

Unsupported Hypotheses: 1b, 2, 5, 9b

Overall the paper found a significant amount of support for the situational theory of publics, and further, for each of the three variables that Major (1998) tested. She found that messages should be targeted at publics that do not already communicate about the possible disaster.

DISCUSSION QUESTION 2: What role does the public relations practitioner take on according to Grunig’s situational theory? How is his or her their judgment affected if his/her perceived risk differs from that of the audience? In other words, how much does the public relations practitioner’s problem and constraint recognition affect their judgment about what to communicate and how?

DISCUSSION QUESTION 3: Why don’t you think that hypotheses 1b, 2, 5, 9b were supported?

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