U., S., & S. Chapters 9 and 12

Before I begin my assessment of the chapters, even if I have mentioned this before, it has to be said that I truly enjoy the ease and straight-forwardness with which Effective Crisis Communication is written. In particular, I enjoy the situational descriptions of previous crises. Chapter 9, Learning Through Failure, began by illustrating the need for organizations to unlearn bad habits by describing the Challenger and Columbia tragedies experienced by NASA. Although my recollection of the Challenger explosion is limited to the now-famous image of the explosion featured in middle and high school history books, the Columbia catastrophe had an impact upon me. In particular, I remember thinking, “how could that happen?” I don’t really know why, but I felt exceptionally saddened when thinking about Kalpana Chawla, the female astronaut who was of Indian descent. The fact that NASA’s ego problems were identified after the Challenger explosion is not as much “bittersweet” (p. 142) as it is just ridiculous. This, however, got me to thinking about a conversation that I had recently. There are certain personalities that simply do not learn vicariously or even from failure. To me, this means that in order for an organization to be able to learn under the different circumstances outlined in the chapter, the organizational leadership needs to be varied enough to have people who exhibit different learning styles. It would not surprise me if, based on the uncommonly elitist status that NASA is regarded under in American society, the personalities within the organization might be lacking variation.

Another point brought up in chapter 9 is that it is important for organizations to rely on their organizational memory. This means that, “[i]f new employees are unwilling to learn from departing ones, the organization’s accumulated knowledge is lost. Thus new employees who want to do things their way could be destined to repeat previous organizational failures” (p. 148) The chapter goes on to advocate for the unlearning of bad habits and willingness to listen to new ideas, but in reading the quoted section above, I wondered if an organization can ever really gauge whether someone is learning or not learning properly unless trouble arises.

The last chapter in the book focused on ways in which crisis can serve as an inspiring renewal to a new normal. The example of Cantor Fitzgerald is one that is once again very memorable to me because, like most Americans, 9/11 was a life-changing event to me. Cantor Fitzgerald was mentioned often in the press within the aftermath because they were the largest amount of space in the World Trade Center. Their responsibility to the families of their 658 families was certainly owned up, and that is truly honorable. However, in reading the section I also thought that Cantor Fitzgerald was not at fault in any way. Being able to start anew is not something that can happen in all situations, especially if there is even a minimal amount of organizational fault. Would anyone disagree with that?

The section titled “Opportunities for Inspiring Renewal to a New Normal,” was concluded with the safety-raising changes that occurred in air travel following the terrorist attacks: “At present, airplanes with too much fuel for a scheduled flight must burn some of it off before they are allowed to take off” (p. 182). The book was copyrighted in 2007. At the risk of sounding like a tree-hugger, I wonder, with the attention that global warming is getting, how socially responsible is it to just sit on a runway and burn fuel? Aren’t the cockpit modifications and security restrictions enough that don’t allow passengers to fly with lip gloss or nail files enough?

I have to say, though the most frustrating part about reading this last chapter was the explanation about how one year after the Columbia accident, NASA was still experiencing some of the communication problems that led to the previous crises. The section concluded by stating that “an organization’s leadership is a key component of any movement to a new normal and renewing response to organizational crisis” (p. 185). This supports my earlier assertion that, perhaps, NASA’s leadership and organizational structure may not be varied enough with regard to personality types to be able to make the necessary changes.